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Developmental and Individual Differences 1 
 
Developmental and Individual Differences in Fluid Intelligence and Speed of 
Processing: Evidence against the Unidimensional Hypothesis.  
 
 In this paper we wish to make two arguments which are in principle 
independent but in practice intertwined.  The first concerns the theoretical issue of 
whether changes in speed of processing can account for developmental change in 
intellectual performance.  The second concerns the methodological problems with the 
data commonly taken to have confirmed the speed theory.  First, we shall deal with 
the theoretical issue.   
 Over the past decade, the theory that increasing speed of information 
processing plays a causal role in the age-related growth of intellectual ability observed 
in children has gained some prominence (Fry & Hale, 1996; Hale, 1990; Kail, 1991a, 
1991b, 1992; Kail & Park, 1994; Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Nettelbeck & Wilson, 
1985).  The main evidence for this theory centres around the robust finding that 
children’s reaction time (RT) becomes faster with age, and this is true for a diversity 
of tasks, suggesting that processing speed is a global causal factor in developmental 
change.  Further, it is argued that RT gains follow an exponential trajectory (Kail, 
1991a), suggesting a biological (maturational) underpinning rather than learning 
(Mazur & Hastie, 1978). 
 A parallel theory in the field of individual differences in intelligence holds that 
differences between high- and low-IQ adults may be attributed to differences in their 
speed of information processing (Jensen, 1985; Nettelbeck, 1987; Anderson, 1992).  
Once again, an abundance of evidence has been amassed showing that IQ groups 
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show systematic differences in RT (Jensen, 1985) and also inspection time (IT), 
another measure of speed of processing (Nettelbeck, 1987). 
 It would be parsimonious to unify these theories so that intellectual variation 
between age groups (or mental age, MA, variance) and within age groups (or IQ 
variance) are accounted for by the one common factor, speed of information 
processing.  We shall refer to this as the unidimensional model of intelligence.  An 
important consequence of this view is that, during the developmental period, MA is a 
fundamental measure while IQ is a derivation from it -- there is no such thing as a 
more or less intelligent child, only a more or less cognitively developed one.  
Similarly, among adults, IQ must be considered a sort of MA at which intellectual 
ability ceases to increase.  This corollary, however, encounters empirical difficulties. 
 Firstly, if MA is a fundamental variable driven by increasing speed of 
processing then we would expect that children of various chronological ages (CA) 
matched for MA should be cognitively indistinguishable.  In fact, such MA-matched 
children display systematically different performance profiles on IQ subtests (Spitz, 
1982) and on information processing tasks (Weiss, Weisz & Bromfield, 1986) with 
younger high-IQ children performing better on tests involving abstract thought and on 
a range of information processing tasks than their older MA-matched counterparts 
(who perform better on tests which tap knowledge and experience).  This implies that 
children of the same MA are not, in fact, matched on information processing 
efficiency if chronological age (and hence also IQ) is allowed to vary.   
 Secondly, under the unidimensional model there is no prima facie reason to 
expect an individual’s IQ to show any continuity with age.  If speed is responsible for 
reasoning ability and it changes with age, then there is no obvious reason why a 
child’s IQ measured at five years of age should predict his or her IQ in early adulthood 
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(as it does, Hindley & Owen, 1978) since the unidimensional model specifies no 
constant factor to account for the stability of IQ differences among children of the 
same cohort. 
 It was partly the recognition of these shortcomings of the unidimensional 
model that led Anderson (1992) to propose an alternative model in which cognitive 
development and individual differences in intelligence represent two distinct 
dimensions of intellectual ability.  We shall refer to this as the multidimensional 
model.    Specifically, Anderson argues that speed of processing is responsible for 
differences in intelligence within age groups, but that speed does not change with age. 
Anderson attributes between-age differences in intellectual ability to the maturation of 
modules and attentional processes.   
 Bjorklund and Harnishfeger (1990) argue that cognitive development is due to 
the maturation of inhibitory processes orthogonal to the activatory processes 
associated with cognitive speed or capacity increase.  They argue that the ability to 
prevent task-irrelevant information from consuming limited cognitive resources 
increases overall efficiency of task-relevant information processing, and they present 
evidence that inhibitory ability improves with age (see also Dempster, 1991).  This 
separation of inhibitory from activatory processing is consistent with Anderson’s 
multidimensional view.  Thus, the key difference between the unidimensional and 
multidimensional models is that the former predicts that speed will be associated with 
both within- and between-age differences in intelligence while the multidimensional 
model predicts that speed will be associated with within-age differences in 
intelligence only. 
 Turning now to the data and the methodological issue, empirical studies have 
used a variety of methods to measure speed, including RT (e.g., Fairweather & Hutt, 
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1978; Jensen, 1982; Kail, 1986) and inspection time (IT) (e.g., Nettelbeck, 1987; 
Nettelbeck & Wilson, 1985) and have reported significant correlations with age and 
also IQ.  Such correlations are not, however, universally accepted as evidence for the 
speed theory.  The two main kinds of objection raised are, firstly, that rather than 
speed causing differences in intellectual ability, intellectual ability might cause 
differences in measured speed.  That is, more intelligent individuals might apply more 
efficient strategies to the speed task (e.g., Hunt, 1980; Sternberg, 1983 and see also 
Fry & Hale, 1996), and secondly, RT and IT tasks might be measuring a host of 
factors other than speed of information processing (e.g., Anderson, 1989; Longstreth, 
1984).  Thus, simple correlations between intellectual ability and RT or IT are 
inadequate tests of the speed theory and a finer grained analysis is called for.  Two 
methods of analysis, which offer the opportunity at least to address some of the 
objections raised above, are the Brinley plot and the partial correlation.  We will 
examine these in turn. 
 
The Brinley Plot Method 
 The Brinley (1965) plot’s logic develops from Hick’s (1952) law, that RT 
increases as a linear function of the amount of information to be processed (measured 
in ‘bits’).  The slope of this function assesses the amount of information processed per 
unit time (i.e., speed of processing) while the intercept represents the amount of time 
consumed by peripheral processes that are constant for an individual across all 
information loads.   Such processes would include perceptual and motoric speed and 
general attentional factors responsible for keeping an individual on task.  (Although 
attentional factors are normally considered central rather than peripheral, for the sake 
of simplicity in the context of this analysis we refer to them as peripheral because 
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their effects would emerge in intercept rather than slope and would not be separable 
from perceptual and motor speed.)  So, for an individual, RT = P + C, where P is 
peripheral processing time and C is central processing time.  The RT of a slower 
individual can be represented as RTslow = aP + bC, where a is the slowing coefficient 
which applies to peripheral processing and b is the slowing coefficient which applies 
to central processing.   
 The Brinley plot involves plotting the RT scores of one group of individuals 
on a range of different tasks and conditions against the RT scores of another group of 
individuals on the same tasks and conditions (Kail, 1991b; Myerson, Wagstaff, & 
Hale, 1994).  The groups most often compared are individuals of different ages 
(children versus young adults or old versus young adults) in order to test the theory 
that speed of processing increases with development and decreases again in old age.  
In the present study we shall be focusing on children.  By algebraic manipulation of 
the equations above, children’s RT across task conditions can be expressed as a 
function of the young adults’ RT, as shown in equation (1) (Cerella, 1990):   
RTchild = bRTadult + P(a-b)    (1)  
(If the central and peripheral slowing factors are equal in magnitude, then this 
equation reduces to a simple multiplicative model:  RTchild = bRTadult.) 
If the plot conforms to a linear function  (R2 is approximately 1), this has traditionally 
been taken as evidence that the change in speed of all central processes in all domains 
is reducible to a single global factor (Kail, 1991b).  However, recent simulation 
studies indicate that R2 can produce both false positive and false negative results  
(Fisk & Fisher, 1994; Perfect, 1994; Anderson, 1995) and it has been argued that 
monotonicity rather than linear fit is a better indicator of unidimensionality (Dunn & 
Kirsner, 1988).   
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The slope of a linear Brinley plot can be interpreted as the difference between 
the two groups’ slopes under the Hick function.  Thus, a slope of one indicates that the 
two groups do not differ in global speed, whereas a slope greater than one indicates a 
difference in central processing speed between the two groups.  The Brinley intercept 
reflects the difference between peripheral and central slowing factors.  Thus, an 
intercept of zero indicates identical peripheral and central slowing, a positive intercept 
indicates that peripheral slowing is greater than central slowing and a negative 
intercept indicates that central slowing exceeds peripheral slowing (Cerella, 1990). 
 Thus, a monotonic Brinley plot suggests that group differences are domain-
general while a non-monotonic plot indicates that group differences are domain-
specific (or a consequence of different strategies being used).  The slope of a linear 
plot reflects any central speed differences between the groups.  The intercept of a 
linear plot reflects the relative magnitude of central versus peripheral slowing 
coefficients in RT task performance.  While Brinley plots may not be ideal for 
distinguishing between domain-general (linear) and domain-specific (non-linear) 
differences in speed, given a linear plot, it should be possible to distinguish between 
true speed differences (slope) and differences in RT task performance due to factors 
other than central speed (intercept). 
 The Brinley plot technique has been used primarily to investigate differences 
in speed of processing between young and old adults (e.g., Cerella, 1994; Cerella & 
Hale, 1994; Fisk & Fisher, 1994; Smith, Poon, Hale, & Myerson, 1988) and also in 
several studies comparing children to young adults (e.g., Fry & Hale, 1996; Hale, 
1990; Kail, 1991b) but not yet to compare high and low IQ children.  The studies 
involving children have been unanimous in their support for the theory that speed 
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drives cognitive development, as indicated by Brinley slope decreasing with age, but 
as we shall see, these conclusions may be premature. 
 
General Requirements of the Brinley Plot 
 For the Brinley plot method to offer an adequate test of the speed theory in 
general, and the unidimensional and multidimensional models in particular, several 
requirements need to be met.  Firstly, to avoid a bias toward linearity, it is necessary 
that the RT tasks sampled invoke plausibly different cognitive systems and, wherever 
possible, systems that might be expected to differ in their course of development.  
Kail (1986, 1991b) and Hale (1990) use tasks to invoke both verbal and spatial 
systems, which evidence suggests to be distinct from each other (e.g., Baddeley, 
1981).  Following Bjorklund & Harnishfeger’s (1990) theory, we will also include a 
task to measure the efficiency of inhibitory processing. 
 A second requirement is that the different groups of individuals are in fact 
using the same processes to perform the RT tasks (Fisk & Fisher, 1994).  Failure to 
meet this requirement could result in a non-linear plot even if cognitive processes 
actually developed in synchrony.  Although determining the component processes 
involved in task performance is notoriously fraught with difficulties (Navon & 
Gopher, 1979), tasks can at least be screened to check that different subject groups 
show the same pattern of RT scores as each other across the task conditions.  It is also 
desirable that the same set of tasks be administered to all age groups so that the same 
speed variable is measured for all subjects (cf Kail’s, 1991b meta-analysis). 
 RT tasks should also be as simple as possible since complex tasks not only 
lead to higher error rates, rendering RT scores difficult to interpret (Salthouse, 1996; 
Kail & Park, 1992) but also open up greater opportunities for strategic differences so 
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that the resulting RT is highly unlikely to represent “speed” in any fundamental sense.  
Although this point is well-recognised in the individual differences literature (e.g. 
Nettelbeck, 1987; Anderson,1992; Jensen, 1982) it tends to be overlooked in 
developmental studies. 
 It is also necessary, if the single global speed hypothesis is to be tested 
seriously, that the participants’ ages cover a range where they might plausibly differ in 
qualitative ways from young adults.  This creates the problem that the most 
theoretically interesting participants, namely, those who are the least developed 
cognitively, are also the most difficult to extract meaningful RT data from.  With the 
exception of Kail (1991b), who included children as young as four years of age, all 
Brinley studies to date have focused on relatively old children, no younger than eight 
(Kail, 1986) and ten (Hale, 1990), respectively, with little in the way of qualitative 
change left to distinguish them from adults (Piaget, 1953).  The inclusion of younger 
children would provide a more rigorous test of the unidimensional model, although 
RT tasks will need to be modified to make them suitable for preschool children, and it 
will be particularly important to establish the reliability of RT scores, as unreliable 
data could result in spuriously non-monotonic plots (Myerson, Wagstaff, & Hale, 
1994).   
 A further recurrent problem in the Brinley studies to date is the lack of 
adequate consideration of the intellectual ability of the participant groups. In 
particular, all studies to date use school children as their child groups and university 
undergraduates as their young adult group for comparison.  Thus, the young adult 
group is not merely older, but also probably of higher IQ than the younger groups 
(although Hale, 1990, reports no significant difference between scaled scores of her 
age groups on the two Wechsler subtests she measured).  Nevertheless, the 
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multidimensional model of intelligence highlights the importance of controlling IQ 
when age groups are compared and controlling age when IQ groups are compared so 
that the effects of each can be isolated. 
 
Methods of Calculating Lines of Best Fit 
 Previous studies have used two different methods for calculating lines of best 
fit for Brinley plots.  While Hale (1990) used a linear model estimating both slope and 
intercept parameters, Kail (1991b) used a multiplicative model calculating lines 
through the origin, so only slope was free to vary.  As we have seen, the multiplicative 
model is only appropriate if central and peripheral processing speed increase with age 
at the same rate, but if this is not the case then the linear model is the more 
appropriate.  In light of Anderson, Nettelbeck and Barlow’s (1997) finding that on 
Jensen’s RT task, which allows RT to be plotted as a function of information load, 
children of different ages differed in intercept rather than slope, we might expect a 
linear function to fit the data better. 
 Furthermore, using R2 values from the multiplicative model (which indexes 
variance about the origin explained) may overestimate the least squares fit of the line 
to the data points because RT scores necessarily fall in the first quadrant.  Thus, Kail’s 
(1991b) very high R2 values (ranging from .908 to .997) may be an artifact of the 
method used to calculate lines of best fit.  As his is the only study to date to include 
preschool-aged children, this further highlights the need for comparing the 
multiplicative model with a linear model. 
 
Brinley Plot Predictions of the Unidimensional and Multidimensional Models 
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 With these methodological considerations in mind, we can proceed to the 
predictions made by the unidimensional and multidimensional speed models with 
regard to Brinley plots of different ability groups.  The unidimensional model, 
according to which speed underlies MA and IQ differences, predicts that Brinley plots 
by age or IQ group should all conform well to the linear model and should all show 
the same systematic pattern, with slope relative to the highest ability group decreasing 
towards 1 as age or IQ increases.  No systematic differences in intercept are predicted 
for age or IQ groups. 
 Anderson’s (1992) version of the multidimensional model, on the other hand, 
states that speed is responsible for IQ but not MA differences, whereas attentional 
factors may be important contributors to MA.  This model predicts that Brinley plots 
will show systematic differences in slope but not intercept between IQ groups.  Age 
groups, however, should not differ systematically in slope, but intercept should 
decrease towards zero as age increases, indicating that attentional factors develop with 
age. 
 
Correlation and Causality -- Partial Correlations 
 In addition to the Brinley plot analysis, this study will examine partial 
correlations between age, speed and reasoning ability.  We have seen that performance 
on speeded tasks and reasoning tasks improves with age during childhood, but this 
does not implicate speed as a causal mechanism underlying cognitive development 
(although a consistent absence of correlation between reasoning ability and speed may 
be reason enough to reject the speed hypothesis).  Salthouse (1985) formulated a 
method for testing whether speed was responsible for age-related changes in reasoning 
performance.  He argued that if changes in speed cause the changes in reasoning 
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ability observed with age then firstly, partialling speed out of the age/reasoning 
correlation should reduce it to zero and, secondly, partialling age out of the 
speed/reasoning correlation should leave it intact. 
 This partial correlation logic has also been applied to children by Nettelbeck & 
Wilson (1994), in this case using IT as a speed measure and receptive vocabulary as a 
measure of MA.  Although, they found no support for either hypothesis, their choice 
of measures may not offer solid grounds for rejecting the speed theory.  In particular, 
the authors point out that vocabulary is a measure of crystallised rather than fluid 
intelligence (Cattell, 1963) so we might expect the relationship between speed and 
vocabulary score to be mediated by age-related experiential factors.  Thus, a measure 
such as Raven’s Matrices would be a more direct measure of fluid ‘g’ (Raven, 1989). 
 The present study will re-examine the relationships between age, intellectual 
ability and speed, evaluating the alternative theories that increasing speed causes 
intellectual development, and that speed remains stable with age but accounts for IQ 
differences.  Both theories predict positive correlations between age, speed and 
reasoning ability.  However, if increasing speed causes reasoning ability to develop 
with age then partialling age out of the speed/reasoning ability correlation will leave it 
intact, while partialling speed out of the age/reasoning ability correlation will reduce it 
to zero.  (It is worth noting that this is the case even if the relationship between speed 
and reasoning ability is itself mediated by speed’s effect on short-term memory as in 
the “cascade” model adopted by Kail, 1992, and Fry & Hale, 1996 from Salthouse, 
1985).  If, on the other hand, speed is not the cause of the development of reasoning 
ability, but underlies individual differences within age groups, then partialling age out 
of the speed/reasoning ability correlation should leave it intact, and partialling speed 
out of the age/reasoning ability correlation should also leave it intact. 
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Isolating Cognitive Processing Time 
 In addition to separating central from peripheral processing speed for groups 
of participants, the present study will attempt to refine RT as a measure of individuals’ 
central processing speed by using a subtractive method (cf Clark & Chase, 1972; 
Jensen & Reed, 1990; Posner & Mitchell, 1967).  By subtracting RT on the task 
condition which contains the least amount of information to be processed from the 
conditions which require more information to be processed, difference scores can be 
obtained for each individual which are arguably better estimates of cognitive speed 
because they eliminate most of the individual variation in peripheral factors.  Under 
the Hick (1952) paradigm, we have seen that these would correspond to an 
individual’s intercept.  Jensen and Reed (1990) demonstrated that, in adults, 
individual variation in intercept (simple RT) was not merely unrelated to individual 
differences in intelligence but, left uncontrolled, this source of variation partly 
obscured the relationship between RT and intelligence.  Although in the present study 
we do not measure simple RT directly, we use an analogous task condition in which 
children are presented with two identical pictures and indicate that they are identical 
by pressing a single button.  We argue that cognitive processing in this condition is 
minimal compared to other task conditions while perceptual and motor response 
requirements of the condition are similar to the other conditions, as are general 
sustained attention factors.  We will compare the results from this new speed measure 
with those derived from the standard RT. 
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Method 
Participants:  One hundred and seven children ranging from four through to nine years 
took part in the study.  In the initial sample there were 19 4-year-olds, 18 5-year-olds, 
16 6-year-olds, 15 7-year-olds, 22 8-year-olds and 17 9-year-olds.  Due to 
unacceptably high error rates on the RT tasks, six children from the 4-year-old group 
and one from the 5-year-old group were excluded from further analyses. 
 The 4- and 5-year-olds came from the preschool affiliated with the University 
of Western Australia, and the older children came from a primary school in a 
predominantly middle-class area in the suburbs of Perth, Western Australia. 
 
Materials and Apparatus:  All RT tasks were carried out on an IBM-compatible 
computer with a six-button response box attached.  The button box was a flat box 20 x 
15 cm with four buttons in a row along one edge, each marked with a line drawing of 
an animal (used in the selective attention task described below).  The other two 
buttons were located on the opposite edge of the box and were marked with a red and 
a blue sticker.  Because the younger children had not yet learned to read, all RT tasks 
used pictorial stimuli.  Additional materials included a picture of the target for the 
spatial processing task drawn on a card, and another card showing all the pictures used 
in the verbal processing task, arranged in their categories. 
 Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) and Raven's Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM) were used to measure fluid intelligence.  The CPM shares 
two of its three sets of items with the SPM.  For comparability with older children, 
young children’s SPM performance is used in the following analyses.  The CPM is 
included as a check on the validity of the SPM among preschoolers.  The two tests 
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have been shown to measure the same ability construct (Irene Styles, personal 
communication, December 1997). 
  
Procedure:  The preschool children were tested individually in a quiet room at their 
preschool over two sessions of approximately twenty minutes.  In the first session, 
they performed the RT tasks and in the second session, they were administered the 
CPM.  If they were showing no obvious signs of fatigue, the preschool children were 
also administered the first six items of sets C, D and E of the SPM.  Following the 
suggestion in the manual (Raven, 1956), young children’s SPM was calculated as their 
score on sets A and B of the CPM (which are the same as sets A and B on the SPM) 
plus any of the additional SPM items from the later sets that they answered correctly.  
For all children, Z scores were calculated by standardising SPM raw scores within 
each school year.1 
 The school children were tested individually in a quiet room at their school on 
the RT tasks, but group tested in their classroom on the SPM.  The three RT tasks, 
selected to sample the speed of a variety of cognitive systems, were:  a spatial 
processing task of the mental rotation type, a verbal processing task of the semantic 
categories type and a selective attention task to measure inhibitory processing. 
 Spatial processing task:  In this task, each child was shown the target picture of 
a horse (“Trevor”).  The horse was drawn so that his four legs were equally spaced 
and the second leg from the back was black.  Children were told that they would see 
some pictures of horses on the computer screen, spun around to different angles (this 
was demonstrated by holding the card against the screen and rotating it) and that they 
had to decide whether the horse on the screen was Trevor or another horse.  The other 
horse was identical to Trevor except that its second leg from the front was black 
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instead of its second leg from the back.  The children pressed the red response button 
if the horse was Trevor and the blue button if it was not Trevor.  Eight practice trials 
were given, corresponding to the eight conditions (‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses at 30, 60, 
120 and 150 degrees of rotation) with the option of repeating the practice if necessary.  
The children were then presented with 64 test trials, eight in each condition, in a 
random sequence.  These appeared in blocks of eight trials, with the option of a rest 
period after each.  Each stimulus appeared for a maximum of four seconds, or until a 
response was made.  For the practice trials, five seconds were allowed.  This time 
restriction was imposed because pilot testing indicated that the youngest children 
needed no more time than this, provided they did not become distracted from the task 
mid-trial.  Thus, the limit helped to ensure that RT measured task performance time 
only.  A correct response was acknowledged by a beep from the computer.  It was 
expected that RT would increase as a linear function of degree of rotation (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971). 
 Verbal processing task:  In this task, children were first shown the card 
depicting the 16 stimulus pictures arranged in their categories.  There were four 
pictures in each category, selected to be good examples of the category and interesting 
for young children to look at.  In order to encourage semantic processing rather than 
just visual processing, they were as dissimilar physically within categories as possible 
(Tipper & Driver, 1988).  The categories were:  food (carrot, cake, ice-cream and 
apple), toys (blocks, ball, teddy bear and rocking horse), clothes (trousers, shirt, shoe 
and hat) and furniture (chair, sofa, television and table).  We ensured that children 
could recognize each object and each category.  Two pictures were presented on the 
computer screen.  If they belonged to the same category, children pressed the red 
button on the button box, otherwise, they were told simply to wait (making this a 
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go/no-go RT task).  Each child received eight practice trials of five seconds duration 
(maximum), followed by 64 test trials of four seconds (maximum) duration.  The 
stimuli were arranged so that each individual picture appeared an equal number of 
times, half the time paired with a semantically related object, and the other half of the 
time paired with an unrelated object.  Thus, the child had to respond to half of the 
trials.  Of the semantically related trials, 25% presented two identical pictures, while 
the remaining 75% presented physically different pictures.  Stimuli were randomly 
ordered, and arranged in blocks of eight trials with a rest option after each block.  
Each correct response was acknowledged with a beep from the computer.  It was 
expected that RTs on the physically identical condition would be shorter than on the 
semantically related condition (Posner & Mitchell, 1967).  
 Selective attention task:  The selective attention task was modelled on a task 
employed by Tipper (1985) and Tipper and Driver (1988) to examine inhibitory 
priming in adults.  In each trial, two overlapping line drawings of animals were 
presented, one drawn in red and the other in blue.  Four of the response buttons were 
labelled with corresponding pictures of the four animals (cat, dog, duck and fish).  On 
each trial, the children were instructed to press the button which corresponded to the 
red stimulus animal on the computer screen, and to ignore the blue stimulus animal.  
Thirty-two stimulus pairs were constructed.  The relative location of the red animal 
(left or right) was counterbalanced, and stimuli were sequenced so as to create four 
different conditions.   
 In the first condition (physically identical) the red and the blue animals were 
the same as each other and unrelated to the animals in the previous trial, so that no 
selective attention was required to respond correctly.  In the second condition 
(previously selected), the red animal was the same as in the previous trial.  In the third 
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condition (unrelated), the red animal was unrelated to either animal in the previous 
trial, and in the fourth condition (previously inhibited), the red animal was the same as 
the blue animal in the previous trial.  There were 85 trials in all, divided into three 
blocks of approximately equal length.  Eight practice trials were given, which 
presented each animal in red twice.  It was expected that both the previously selected 
and the physically identical conditions would produce shorter RTs than the unrelated 
condition, and that the previously inhibited condition would produce longer RTs than 
the unrelated condition. 
  
Results 
 First, RT data were examined to ensure that participants were responding at an 
adequate level of accuracy.  Each individual’s data was plotted and outlying RTs more 
than 2.5 standard deviations from the median were removed.  Each subject’s median 
score on each task condition was then recalculated.  If a subject did not respond 
correctly at least 75% of the time on each task condition then his or her scores on that 
task were excluded from further analyses.  This resulted in seven preschool children 
being excluded from the study and fifteen other children having some missing data.   
 The subject pool was categorized in two ways:  by school year (six groups) 
and by SPM Z-score calculated separately within each year group (3 equal groups).2  
The characteristics of these groups are outlined in Table 1.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Developmental and Individual Differences 18 
Experimental Effects 
 RT data were then examined task by task to determine whether the 
experimental manipulation in each task condition had the predicted effect on 
children’s RT scores across all age groups.  Additionally, error rates were examined in 
case experimental effects on RT were confounded by compensatory changes in 
accuracy. 
 Spatial task 
 Table 2 shows the mean RT scores obtained by children within each age group 
for each condition of the spatial task, as well as percentage of trials incorrect.  In 
general, RT decreased with age (F (5, 86) = 34.77, p < .001), except that the 4-year-
olds out-performed the 5-year-olds.  The differences between age groups were 
considerably greater in magnitude than differences between conditions, although main 
effects for task condition were significant (F (1, 86) = 53.75, p < .001 for response 
condition; F (3, 258) = 20.64, p < .001 for degree of rotation).  No significant 
interactions were found between year and task conditions, so there is no evidence that 
different age groups were affected differently by the experimental manipulations.  
Error rate decreased significantly across year groups (F (5, 85) = 2.73, p < .05), and 
response condition and degree of rotation both produced main effects on error rate (F 
(1, 85) = 2.34, p < .05 and F (3, 255) = 5.92, p < .01, respectively).  However, year 
group did not interact with either task condition factor, so speed-accuracy trade-offs 
are unlikely to have distorted the year groups’ pattern of RT means relative to each 
other. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Developmental and Individual Differences 19 
 The change in RT with increasing degree of stimulus rotation does not 
conform to the monotonic increase argued by Shepard and Metzler (1971) to 
characterise mental rotation tasks, the most marked deviation in these data being that 
responses at 60-degree rotation are faster than at 30-degree rotation.  This may 
indicate that the processes used were not exclusively mental rotation, but given the 
nature of the task, some amount of spatial processing seems inevitable.  Furthermore, 
although this was not predicted, it conforms reasonably well to the RT pattern of one 
of Kail’s (1986) 8-year-old groups (the youngest group he sampled) on a spatial task, 
and thus does not appear to be an effect restricted to the present task.  Since the 
pattern of results is consistent across age groups, it suggests that the processes 
employed do not vary with age in this sample, and thus the RT means can justifiably 
be included in the Brinley plots to follow. 
 Verbal task 
 The mean RT and error rate of each year group on the verbal task are shown in 
the top section of Table 3.  As predicted, the physically identical stimuli clearly 
produced faster responses than the semantically related stimuli (F (1, 89) = 363.14, p 
< .001).  Older year groups were faster than younger groups (F (5, 89) = 39.00, p < 
.001).  The interaction between task condition and year group was also significant, 
indicating that the difference in RT between the two conditions decreased with age (F 
(5, 89) = 8.45, p < .001).  It can be seen that the number of errors is slightly elevated 
in the 4-year-old group relative to the others, but there is no significant effect of year 
on error rate (F (5, 89) = 1.8, n.s.). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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 Selective attention task 
 The mean RT of the each year group on each condition of the selective 
attention task and percentage errors are shown in the lower section of Table 3.  The 
older children were significantly faster to respond than the younger children (F (5, 89) 
= 28.00, p < .001).  Task condition significantly affected RT (F (3, 267) = 49.22, p < 
.001).  As predicted, performance on the physically identical and previously selected 
conditions of the task was considerably faster than on the unrelated condition (t (94) = 
4.91, 10.93, respectively, ps < .001).  However, counter to predictions, the previously 
inhibited condition was no slower than the unrelated condition (t (94) = .79, n.s.).  
This may indicate that children in this age range do not yet actively inhibit irrelevant 
information.  An alternative possibility is that inhibitory effect is short-lived and the 
present methodology failed to elicit it by allowing relatively long intertrial intervals.  
There was no significant interaction between year and task condition (F (15, 267) = 
1.13, n.s.), suggesting that task manipulations affect children of all ages to a similar 
extent.  Although there was a main effect for condition in error rates (F (3, 267) = 
14.19, p < .001) there was no effect for year group (F (5, 89) = 1.02, n.s.) and neither 
did condition interact with year group (F (15, 267) = 1.03, n.s.). 
 In summary, the experimental effects predicted for each of the tasks were 
mostly borne out, and the Brinley requirements that tasks sample a variety of 
processes and that different age groups employ the same set of processes appear to 
have been met adequately.  
Reliability 
 Because reliability is important if Brinley plots are to be interpretable and 
because young children may not produce reliable RT data, split-half reliability was 
calculated for the mean RT of each age group within each condition.  Table 4 shows 
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Guttman’s coefficient for each group under each task condition.  For most age groups 
and most conditions reliability is reasonably high.  However, some cells, particularly 
from the younger children show low Guttman coefficients.  This problem may be 
attenuated by removing the unreliable estimates and comparing the plots of the 
remaining estimates to those with all data included, but results from the preschoolers 
will need to be interpreted with some caution. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Brinley plots 
 The mean RT of younger children on each condition of each task was plotted 
against that of the 9-year-olds.  This part was a simple replication of numerous papers 
published to date (e.g., Hale, 1990;  Kail, 1986, 1991b; Kail & Park, 1992).  As a 
further extension of this, groups defined by SPM Z score were also plotted against 
each other. 
 Figure 1 (cells A and B) show the Brinley plots by age.  In cell A, the intercept 
of the line of best fit has been allowed to vary, following Hale’s (1990) linear model 
whereas in cell B, the intercept has been fixed at the origin, following Kail’s (1991b) 
multiplicative model.  The parameter estimates of these lines with their 95% 
confidence intervals and adjusted R2 values are shown in Table 5.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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 From these results, several things are apparent.  Firstly, the 2-parameter regression 
lines vary considerably in the amount of variance they explain.  The line for the 5-year-
old group does not explain even a significant proportion of the variance, and only in the 
7- and 8-year-old groups does the R2  value reach a particularly high level.  Allowing for 
standard error, the plots are reasonably monotonic.  The major exceptions to this are:  for 
the 4-year-olds the semantically related condition of the verbal task is disproportionately 
difficult compared to the spatial task, and the Previously Selected condition of the  
selective attention task is disproportionately easy relative to some conditions on each of 
the other two tasks.  For 5-year-olds, the Physically Same and Previously Selected 
conditions on the attention task are disproportionately easy relative to the spatial task.  
For the 7-  and 8-year-olds, the only violation of the monotonic pattern is that they are 
disproportionately slow on the 30-degree rotation condition relative to the 60-degree 
rotation.   
When intercept as well as slope is allowed to vary, intercept decreases as age 
increases, and most age groups’ intercept estimates fall outside each other’s confidence 
intervals, whereas slope shows no clear systematic relationship with age and there is a 
large amount of overlap between confidence intervals. 
 The slope estimates all contain 1 in their confidence intervals, implying no 
significant difference in speed between age groups, and intercept is greater than zero, 
implying that older children have a faster baseline response time.  Finally, for the 1-
parameter regression equations, where the intercept is fixed at the origin, Kail’s method 
replicates his findings:  R2  values are universally extremely high and there is a strong 
trend for slope to decrease with age with little overlap in confidence intervals (the only 
exception being the reversal of the slope parameters of 4- and 5-year-olds).  One-
parameter slope is more highly correlated with 2-parameter intercept (r (5) = .97, p < .01)  
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than with 2-parameter slope (r (5) = -.76, n.s.) -- and, indeed, the latter correlation is 
negative. 
 Comparing the equations using all of the available conditions with those which 
only use means from conditions with a minimum reliability of .5 (Table 5), it can be seen 
that increasing reliability increases linearity for the 5-year-old and 6-year-old groups, but 
also strengthens the pattern of decreasing intercept and increasing slope with age in the 2-
parameter solutions.  (Four-year-olds’ data show no significant linearity, probably due to 
the small number of points left.)  Using the restricted data has virtually no effect on the 1-
parameter solutions.  Nevertheless, the R2 of all three of the youngest groups remains 
well below 1.00 and well below that of the older two groups even when the reliability of 
their means is made comparable, suggesting a genuine increase in linearity with age 
which is not attributable to reliability alone.   
 Cells C and D of Figure 1 show the Brinley plots of mean RT on each task 
condition for successive Z groups, and Table 6 contains the parameter estimates and 
amount of variance explained by each regression equation.  All regression lines explain a 
reasonably large amount of variance, but neither intercept nor slope shows a systematic 
pattern across Z groups.  From cell D of Figure 1 it is evident that the 1-parameter 
regression lines for Z1 and Z2 are virtually indistinguishable, although neither group’s 
confidence interval includes 1.00 suggesting that both are slower than Z3. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
 In summary, the key findings from these analyses are, firstly, that when a simple 
multiplicative model is applied to RT (following the method of Kail, 1991b) slope 
decreases systematically towards 1.00 as age increases.  However, when Z is used to 
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define the groups, only the highest group has a significantly different slope.  Secondly, 
using a 2-parameter linear model dramatically changes the results:  R2 is generally much 
lower, intercept takes on the strong, systematic relationship with age and slope is largely 
unrelated to age.  Z groups show no systematic association with either parameter.  Finally, 
the slope estimate for each plot is vastly different depending on whether on not the 
intercept is also allowed to vary. 
Refining RT as a Speed Measure 
Given that RT is not an especially pure measure of speed of information 
processing since it contains a substantial peripheral component which is a source of 
individual differences but does not vary systematically with intellectual ability, at least 
among adults (Jensen, 1982), we have attempted to filter out the time consumed by 
these peripheral factors at an individual level using a subtractive method (Jensen & 
Reed, 1990).  We consider this to be worth doing because although intercept 
differences in Brinley plots are informative about systematic differences between 
nominated groups (e.g. age groups) in the time consumed by these factors, 
unsystematic differences within groups may mask genuine between-group differences 
in speed.   
Of all the task conditions, the physically identical condition in the verbal 
processing task was deemed to have the smallest cognitive processing requirements as 
it consisted of recognising that two stimuli were identical without need for any 
information to be manipulated, and pressing a single button in response (no choice 
was involved), making it similar to Jensen’s (1982) simple RT.  Empirically, too, this 
was the easiest condition, as it consistently produced the fastest response times across 
all groups of children.  This condition thus provided an estimate of the 
attentional/motor response component common to all the RT tasks.  Using this, 
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“cognitive processing time” (CPT) was estimated for each child on each of the other 
task conditions by subtracting median RT on the physically identical condition (a 
constant for each individual) from median RT on the other conditions.   
 Although this is still not an ideal speed measure, difference scores being 
necessarily less reliable than the measured scores from which they are derived (Ferguson, 
1986 – and mean CPT reliability estimate for each age group appears in the bottom row 
of Table 4), the proportion of speed variance to non-speed variance in CPT is arguably 
higher than in RT.  Under Kail’s (1991b) single global speed model, this procedure ought 
not to affect the Brinley plot because the same set of processes are subtracted from all 
groups’ RT scores, so, provided that all processes do indeed conform to the same 
developmental path, CPT ought to behave in exactly the same way as RT.  Where full 
data sets were available to calculate mean RT and CPT across all tasks, the two variables 
were found to be weakly but significantly correlated (r (86) = .23, p < .05). 
 The Brinley plot analysis was repeated for CPT data.  This time, only 1-parameter 
models were used because factors contributing to any intercept differences were equalised 
among individuals by the subtraction procedure.  Figure 2 shows the Brinley plots and 
lines of best fit for age and Z groups.  Table 7 shows the parameters of these lines and the 
amount of variance explained by each. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
 These data reveal a rather more chaotic pattern across age groups than the RT 
data did.  The R2  values are generally lower since the data points are now nearer to the 
origin.  There is no evidence of a systematic relationship occurring in slope with age.  
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The Z plots, however, are generally more linear than those of the age groups, and 
slope decreases across groups with virtually no overlap in confidence intervals.  Thus 
CPT slope is systematically related to Z score (or IQ) but not to age. 
Partial Correlation Analyses 
 For each child, mean RT and mean CPT were calculated for each of the three 
tasks.  Overall mean RT and CPT was then calculated by taking the means of the task 
means (to avoid biasing scores towards the task with the greatest number of 
conditions).   Table 8 shows the correlations and partial correlations among the three 
variables Age, Reasoning Ability and Speed, where “speed” is measured as overall 
mean RT and mean CPT.3  As predicted, SPM performance correlated highly with 
age, as did RT.  The correlation between SPM and RT was also quite strong.  
However, contrary to the predictions of the unidimensional model, partialling RT out 
of the SPM/Age correlation had minimal effect (see cell A).  The correlation is 
reduced but remains highly significant, indicating that there is a very substantial 
relationship between age and reasoning ability that is independent of speed, as 
indexed by RT.  On the other hand, partialling Age out of the SPM/RT correlations 
reduces it to zero (see cell B).  Thus, RT and SPM are only related to each other 
through their mutual correlation with Age, consistent with the findings of Nettelbeck 
& Wilson (1994) with inspection time, and Fry & Hale (1996) with RT.  Furthermore, 
there is no significant correlation between RT and SPM Z score. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 When CPT is used as a speed measure, the partial correlations behave quite 
differently from those using RT.  CPT does not correlate significantly with Age (cell 
D).  There is, however, a weak but significant correlation between SPM (both raw 
Developmental and Individual Differences 27 
score and Z score) and CPT.  Where partialling RT out of the SPM/Age correlation 
reduced it slightly, partialling out CPT leaves it largely unaffected (cell A).  There is a 
much weaker correlation between SPM and CPT than between SPM and RT but when 
Age is partialled out, this remains intact (cell C), indicating that age is not a mediating 
factor between CPT and SPM. 
Thus, the partial correlation results are highly consistent with those of the 
Brinley plot analyses.  Absolute RT is associated with age rather than fluid 
intelligence while CPT is associated with fluid intelligence rather than age. 
Discussion 
 It is apparent that different methods of determining line of best fit (1- or 2-
parameter models) and of measuring speed (RT and CPT) suggest vastly different 
theoretical interpretations.  Following Kail’s (1991b) methodology of fitting a 1-
parameter model to RT data, the present results replicate his findings, corroborating 
his conclusion that speed of processing, as measured by the slope parameter, increases 
with age.  However, the 1-parameter lines offer no reason to believe that Z groups 
containing children from a range of ages differ at all in their speed of processing.  
While, on the face of it, this would seem to negate the unidimensional model (speed 
may underlie development but not IQ differences), it might be argued that during the 
developmental period IQ has no fundamental existence anyway, being merely derived 
from MA, so any difference in speed between IQ groups will be of trivial magnitude 
compared to the differences between age groups.  Thus, the 1-parameter findings seem 
most consistent with the unidimensional model. 
 The 2-parameter lines of best fit for the RT data, however, tell a strikingly 
different tale.  When intercept is allowed to vary from the origin, it is intercept rather 
than slope that is systematically related to developmental status.  Intercept represents 
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the difference between peripheral and central slowing factors for an age group.  Since 
central processing speed (as indicated by slope) is invariant across age groups, the 
pattern of intercepts must be due to change in peripheral processing factors common 
to all tasks.  Since there is no convincing evidence from the RT data that slope or 
intercept are related systematically to within-age differences in fluid intelligence, this 
set of Brinley plots not only refutes the unidimensional model (age and Z scores 
producing characteristically different plots) but also implies that speed of processing 
has no great explanatory power with regard to developmental change or individual 
differences in intellectual ability. 
 Finally, when CPT rather than RT is plotted, the theoretical interpretation is 
different again.  This time speed appears to increase across Z groups (despite Z groups 
containing a wide range of ages) but to be unrelated to developmental status, which is 
most consistent with Anderson’s (1992) version of the multidimensional model.  
 The partial correlation analyses show much the same pattern.  Using RT as a 
speed measure, the relationship between speed and reasoning ability appears to be 
entirely mediated by age, so it can account for neither MA differences nor IQ 
differences.  All that can be concluded is that both SPM and RT task performance 
improve independently with age, conforming to what Lindenberger & Pötter (1998) 
refer to as the ‘spuriousness model’ where there is no direct relationship between 
speed and reasoning ability (and also consistent with the findings of Fry & Hale, 
1996). 
 The results from the CPT correlations, however, suggest a different 
interpretation.  Like RT, CPT plays no mediating role in the relationship between age 
and reasoning ability, again suggesting that increasing speed cannot be the cause of 
MA increases.  However, the correlation between CPT and SPM performance is not 
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mediated by age.  The fact that CPT fails to correlate with age at all is most consistent 
with the interpretation that speed underlies stable within-age differences in reasoning 
ability and does not develop with age, that is, Anderson’s (1992) theory.  
 Thus, different Brinley methods and different measures of speed yield quite 
different theoretical interpretations.  These conflicting results leave us with two 
questions:  firstly, how the discrepancies between the findings of different methods 
might be explained and, secondly, which theoretical interpretation offers the best 
account of the findings. 
 
One- versus Two-Parameter Lines of Best Fit 
 We have seen from Jensen (1982) that when we plot RT over information 
load, both slope and intercept are sources of individual variation, and that slope rather 
than intercept is related to intellectual ability in adults.  Furthermore, the present 
results suggest that 1-parameter slope differences between age groups confound true 
slope with intercept differences, and indeed, correlate extremely highly with intercept.   
From this, Kail’s (1991b) use of 1-parameter lines of best fit is inappropriate, and the 
argument that performing no operations takes no time so intercept should be zero is 
flawed.  Although the R2 values for the 1-parameter lines were uniformly high (and 
higher than those for 2-parameter lines) this is entirely due to the fact that the values 
represent different variance.  Thus, from the RT plots, what differs between age 
groups is not speed of information processing but task performance factors that are 
constant across all quantities and types of information to be processed, such as 
motoric speed and attention. 
 
Reaction Time versus Cognitive Processing Time 
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 The issue of whether RT or CPT is the better measure of speed of processing 
is not entirely straightforward.  In principle, CPT ought to be the purer measure as it 
removes, at an individual level, variance in RT due to performance factors unrelated 
to task difficulty (such as the attentional and motoric factors mentioned above).  In 
practice, difference scores are less reliable than direct measures (Ferguson, 1986) so 
the error variance in CPT (which is very great for two age groups in this experiment) 
may conceal systematic patterns in speed between participant groups.  However, 
CPT’s lack of reliability is unbiased in its effects – the risk is that genuine differences 
will not emerge, not that spurious differences will emerge.4 
The validity of CPT as a speed measure could also be questioned.  For 
example, it might be argued that between-task differences in perceptual and motor 
factors mean that CPT actually contains a substantial amount of peripheral variance.  
Furthermore, if the condition taken as baseline includes a substantial amount of 
central processing time then when we subtract it from other conditions, CPT may 
actually contain less speed variance than RT did.  Although CPT cannot be regarded 
as an ideal speed measure, we argue that the perceptual requirements (perceiving two 
line drawings) and the motor requirements (using one finger to press a button) are 
reasonably well matched between tasks.  There is an important difference between 
tasks in the response selection component of motor response (choosing from one 
button versus two or four) but this is also the case in Jensen’s RT task (Jensen, 1982), 
the slope of which is considered to measure speed and correlates with IQ among 
adults – so from this point of view, response selection (as distinct from response 
execution) is considered a central process.  Interestingly, age differences in “response 
selection” speed only emerge when children are required to use different fingers to 
press different buttons (Fairweather & Hutt, 1978) and not when they use the same 
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finger (Anderson, Nettelbeck & Barlow, 1997).  In any event, the major finding from 
the present study is that RT is itself multidimensional and one of those dimensions 
aligns itself with development and  the other with within-age differences in fluid 
intelligence.  Given that RT behaves as Brinley intercept and CPT behaves as Brinley 
slope, we interpret the former primarily as a measure of peripheral processes and the 
latter as a measure of central processes, but this study alone may be inadequate to 
establish the veracity of this interpretation. 
 
 The present Brinley plot results do not support the notion that speed of 
information processing changes with age.  This clearly conflicts with the claims of 
Kail (1986, 1991b), and more importantly Hale (1990) and Fry and Hale (1996) who 
used 2-parameter lines of best fit. 
 One potentially important difference between the present study and previous 
ones is that previous studies have used university undergraduates as their adult group 
while the present study uses 9-year-olds as the oldest group.  The reason for using 
school children exclusively in the present study was to avoid confounding age with IQ 
(Anderson, 1992).  If the single global speed theory is correct, then the particular age 
groups selected for the Brinley plots make no difference, and since the present study 
focuses on a period of life where cognitive development should be proceeding at a 
particularly rapid rate, the present age range should still be quite adequate to find 
changes in speed. 
 Of more concern is the possibility that the present Brinley plots by age group 
may simply be a reflection that the RT data from younger children are not as reliable 
as those for older children and adults.  That is, age-related increases in reliability 
would produce relatively low R2 values, slopes less than one and intercept greater than 
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zero.  Nevertheless, for each task condition, Guttman coefficients are predominantly 
high for RT of the school-aged children, though somewhat lower for the preschool 
children.  It may be that the present study cannot confidently draw many conclusions 
about the speed of processing of the preschool groups, but it seems unlikely 
nonetheless that the pattern of results for the older groups can be accounted for solely 
by changes in reliability. 
 Given the lack of overlap between the age groups sampled here and those of 
Hale (1990) it is not possible to make any direct comparisons between findings.  The 
pattern found for the present younger sample may not hold for older children and 
adolescents.  Interestingly, Cerella & Hale (1994) reanalyse data from Kail (1991b) 
using a 2-parameter model and find systematic decline in intercept across the present 
range of ages (and some low R2 values among younger children) – although 2-
parameter slope is still found to decrease with age. 
Conditions that violated the monotonicity of the Brinley plots were all reliable.  
For older children, these seemed to reflect a change in strategy within the spatial task.  
For the preschool children, however, the violations appeared between tasks indicating 
firstly a developmental decrease in the relative difficulty of semantic categorisation 
relative to spatial manipulation and secondly a developmental decline in the benefits 
of reducing a task’s distracting features and removing the need to change motor 
responses from trial to trial.  This is consistent with the notion that different processes 
may develop at different rates (consistent with Anderson’s, 1992, module maturation 
account), and that substantial development in inhibitory ability (both cognitive and 
motoric) occurs between about five and six years of age (consistent with Bjorkund & 
Harnishfeger, 1990).  We argue that developmental change in inhibitory ability could 
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explain the improvements we observe in both RT task performance and reasoning 
tasks. 
 There are several possible ways in which inhibitory ability might influence 
SPM performance.  One is that the matrices themselves sometimes contain multiple 
patterns so that each much be attended to in turn while the others are filtered out.  
Another is that the multiple choice format of the test requires children to inhibit the 
influence of particularly compelling or eye-catching distractors and use logic rather 
than impulse to reach the correct answer.  A third way in which inhibition may be 
influential is that, when problem type changes, children need to change strategies, 
which means inhibiting the old strategy they were using to replace it with a new one.  
So, it at least makes sense that inhibitory ability may constitute a significant part of 
ability to solve SPM items, and one which develops with age. 
 
Conclusions 
 In summary, the present results stand in opposition to the unidimensional 
speed theory of fluid intelligence.  They suggest that the RT measure is, itself, 
multidimensional, with different components aligning with within-age differences in 
fluid intelligence and with development.  From this point of view, it appears that IQ is 
a fundamental measure even during childhood, and that MA is a conglomerate of 
developmental status and IQ (Anderson, 1992).  We have argued that central 
processing speed is related to within-age differences in fluid intelligence, while 
inhibitory ability relates to the development of fluid intelligence.  As the meaning of 
the term ‘speed’ varies considerably between studies, we will clarify our intended 
meaning.  The real meaning of speed is given by the context in which it is used (viz. 
Anderson’s 1992 model).  For those preferring a theory-neutral meaning, we intend 
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that speed relates to the general efficiency of the biological underpinnings of 
cognition, and we take it that this paper goes some way towards establishing that these 
biological parameters are not subject to change, in contrast to the attentional and 
peripheral processes examined in this paper.  Future research in which the processing 
speed requirements and selective attentional requirements of tasks are manipulated 
independently of each other will help to test the validity of this interpretation.  
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Table 1.   
Characteristics of Participants Grouped by Age and SPM Z score (IQ). 
Group  (n) Mean Age (Range) Mean SPM 
Raw Score 
(Range) 
Mean Z Score 
(Range) 
Age        
4y (13) 4.49 (3.92 -  4.83) 13 (9 – 16) -.20a (-2.00 – 1.47) 
5y (17) 5.46 (4.92 -  6.16) 15 (11 – 27) .07a (-1.00 – 3.00) 
6y (16) 6.40 (5.92 -  6.92) 19 (12 – 28) -.07a (-1.40 – 1.80) 
7y (15) 7.51 (7.08 -  8.16) 28 (14 – 45) 0 (-1.40 – 1.73) 
8y (22) 8.41 (8.00 -  9.00) 30 (10 – 43) 0 (-2.20 – 1.47) 
9y (17) 9.42 (8.75 – 10.08) 41 (25 – 51) 0 (-2.27 – 1.40) 
Z        
Z1 (low)  (31) 7.03 (3.92 – 10.08) 18 (9 – 37) -1.07  (-2.27 – -.60) 
Z2  (34) 7.04 (4.42 – 9.67) 24 (12 – 43)  0.13  (-.53 – .27) 
Z3 (high)  (35) 7.25 (4.16 – 9.83) 32 (14 – 51) 1.00  (.40 -  3.00) 
a The mean Z varies slightly from zero in the youngest three age groups because Z was 
calculated using SPM scores from all participants, several of whom were subsequently 
excluded from the analysis because of their unacceptably poor RT task performance. 
  
Table 2.   
Mean (sd) RT (ms) and Percentage Errors for Age Groups on Spatial Task. 
 Age Groups (years) 
 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 
Same RT 30-degrees 2346 
(692) 
2280 
(470) 
1932 
(337) 
1620 
(466) 
1182 
(275) 
1076 
(252) 
 RT 60-degrees 2157 
(485) 
2304 
(630) 
1709 
(394) 
1437 
(308) 
1143 
(252) 
1101 
(364) 
 RT 120-degrees  2251 
(489) 
2559 
(604) 
1945 
(529) 
1719 
(555) 
1263 
(321) 
1172 
(272) 
 RT 150-degrees 2303 
(386) 
2468 
(423) 
1937 
(387) 
1586 
(376) 
1335 
(370) 
1227 
(350) 
Different RT 30-degrees 2490 
(426) 
2696 
(624) 
1999 
(430) 
1681 
(424) 
1388 
(308) 
1131 
(260) 
 RT 60-degrees 2198 
(336) 
2446 
(679) 
1954 
(406) 
1509 
(352) 
1254 
(341) 
1179 
(264) 
 RT 120-degrees 2446 
(490) 
2793 
(749) 
2111 
(442) 
1808 
(453) 
1396 
(313) 
1335 
(398) 
 RT 150-degrees 2440 
(546) 
2429 
(518) 
2237 
(753) 
1851 
(533) 
1380 
(364) 
1329 
(348) 
 % Errors 4.4 
(4.2) 
2.2 
(1.7) 
2.1 
(1.8) 
1.8 
(1.6) 
2.0 
(1.8) 
1.7 
(1.8) 
 
 
  
Table 3.   
Mean (sd) RT (ms) and Percent Errors by Age Group on Verbal Task and Selective 
Attention Task. 
 Age Group (years) 
 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 
Verbal Task       
RT Physically Identical 
 
1836 
(283) 
1877 
(513) 
1443 
(323) 
1142 
(236) 
992  
(271) 
875  
(168) 
RT Semantically Related 
 
2580 
(376) 
2295 
(476) 
1976 
(388) 
1570 
(304) 
1293 
(252) 
1122 
(221) 
% Errors 1.90 
(2.33) 
.80  
(1.21) 
.94  
(.77) 
1.20 
(1.57) 
1.77 
(1.23) 
1.82 
(1.51) 
Selective Attention Task       
Physically Same 2450 
(344) 
2358 
(384) 
2032  
(224) 
1792 
(306) 
1518 
(266) 
1467  
(458) 
Previously Selected 2229 
(267) 
2133 
(313) 
1796 
(176) 
1777 
(330) 
1342 
(257) 
1319  
(349) 
Unrelated 2511 
(265) 
2467 
(285) 
2170  
(323) 
1961 
(329) 
1595 
(347) 
1571  
(439) 
Previously Inhibited 2410 
(265) 
2472 
(396) 
2183  
(300) 
1959 
(357) 
1564 
(311) 
1564  
(493) 
% Errors 4.4  
(2.6) 
4.2  
(3.9) 
2.9 
(2.2) 
2.5  
(2.2) 
4.1  
(2.6) 
2.8 
(3.5) 
  
Table 4.  Guttman’s Split-Half Reliability Coefficient for Age Groups and All 
Children on Each Task Condition. 
 Age Group (years) 
 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y All children 
Spatial Task        
30o same  .72  .32  .58  .80  .75  .90  .86 
60o same  .47 -.08  .78  .91  .74  .81  .82 
120o same  .68  .71  .69  .84  .79  .82  .88 
150o same -.18  .60  .33  .80  .62  .82  .81 
30o different  .59  .79  .58  .72  .68  .24  .85 
60o different  .59  .81  .70  .87  .89  .93  .92 
120o different  .49  .73  .59  .88  .79  .85  .87 
150o different  .63  .64  .80  .84  .67   .83  .87 
All conditions  .90  .89  .94  .97  .91  .94  .97 
Verbal Task        
Physically Identical .40 .86 .74 .76 .83 .81 .91 
Semantically Related .92 .82 .94 .92 .83 .96 .96 
Both conditions .81 .87 .94 .94 .86 .96 .96 
Selective Attention        
Physically Identical .65 .71 .51 .89 .73 .95 .92 
Previously Selected .39 .35 .14 .85 .83 .92 .89 
Unrelated .71 .46 .84 .91 .93 .96 .94 
Previously Inhibited .27 .75 .74 .74 .84 .96 .92 
All conditions .81 .79 .79 .92 .95 .98 .97 
  
Mean CPT reliability  .04 .49 .23 .63 .55 .48 .58 
 
Table 5.   
Estimated Parameters of Lines from Brinley Plots of Mean RT by Age:  One and Two 
Parameter Solutions (For All Points, and Excluding Points where Reliability <.5). 
Age 
(years) 
No. data 
points 
Intercept 
(ms) 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
Slope 
 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
Adjusted 
R2 
All Data Points      
4 14 1597 980 - 2214 .59 .10 - 1.08 .31 * 
5 14 1791 963 - 2618 .49 -.17 - 1.14 .11 n.s. 
6 14 945 411 - 1480 .81 .39 - 1.24 .55 ** 
7 14 414 32 - 796 1.01 .71 - 1.31 .80 *** 
8 14 316 27 - 605 .80 .57 - 1.03 .81 *** 
4 14 -- -- 1.84 1.71 - 1.97 .98 *** 
5 14 -- -- 1.89 1.73 - 2.05 .98 *** 
6 14 -- -- 1.55 1.46 - 1.64 .99 *** 
7 14 -- -- 1.33 1.28 - 1.38 1.00 *** 
8 14 -- -- 1.05 1.01 - 1.09 1.00 *** 
Reliable Data Points Only   
4 7 1999 1068 - 2930 .33 -.39 - 1.04 .06 n.s. 
5 9 1415 452 - 2378 .78 .01 - 1.54 .37 * 
6 11 900 329 - 1470 .86 .41 - 1.31 .64 ** 
7 13 379 1 - 757 1.03 .73 - 1.33 .82 *** 
8 13 314 6 - 623 .80 .56 - 1.05 .81 *** 
    table continues
  
 
4 7 -- -- 1.85 1.62 - 2.08 .98 *** 
5 9 -- -- 1.89 1.71 - 2.07 .99 *** 
6 11 -- -- 1.56 1.45 - 1.66 .99 *** 
7 13 -- -- 1.32 1.27 - 1.38 1.00 *** 
8 13 -- -- 1.05 1.01 - 1.09 1.00 *** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
  
 Table 6.   
Estimated Parameters of Lines from Brinley Plots of Mean RT by Z -- One and Two 
Parameter Solutions. 
Z Intercept 
(ms) 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
Slope 
 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
Adjusted R2 
 
Z1 -294 -732 - 145 1.26 1.00 - 1.52   .89 *** 
Z2  330 -118 - 778 .79 .61 - 1.15   .79 *** 
Z1 -- -- 1.08 1.06 - 1.11 1.00 *** 
Z2 -- -- 1.08 1.05 - 1.11 1.00 *** 
*** p < .001 
 
  
Table 7.   
Estimated Parameters of Lines from Brinley Plots of Mean CPT by Age and Z. 
Group Slope 
 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
Adjusted R2 
Year group    
4 .95 .71 - 1.20 .84 *** 
5 1.14 .71 - 1.56 .72 *** 
6 1.30 1.06 - 1.54 .91 *** 
7 1.37 1.18 - 1.56 .95 *** 
8 .89 .80 - .97 .98 *** 
Z    
Z1 1.35 1.24 - 1.46 .98 *** 
Z2 1.15 .99 - 1.31 .95 *** 
*** p < .001 
  
Table 8. 
Partial Correlation Analysis of Age, Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) and Speed (RT 
and CPT). 
Variables Correlated Variable Partialled Out   r 
Global Speed (n = 86)   
 SPM/Age --   .81 *** 
 SPM/Age RT   .56 *** 
 SPM/Age CPT   .79 *** 
 SPM/RT -- -.69 *** 
 SPM/RT Age -.07 n.s. 
 SPM/CPT -- -.29 ** 
 SPM/CPT Age -.24 * 
 RT/Age -- -.83 *** 
 CPT/Age -- -.18 n.s. 
 RT/Z -- -.06 n.s. 
 CPT/Z -- -.25 * 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
  
Figure 1 (A-D).  Brinley plots of mean RT (s), by Age Group (A, B) and Z Group (C, D) 
with 1- and 2-parameter Lines of Best Fit. 
 
Figure 2 (A-B).  Brinley Plots of Mean CPT (s), by Age Group and Z Group, with 1-
Parameter Lines of Best Fit. 
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Abstract 
The Brinley plot and partial correlation methods are used to investigate conjointly the 
theories that increasing speed of processing is responsible for changes in mental age 
(MA) and that speed of processing gives rise to within-age differences in fluid 
intelligence (IQ).  One hundred and seven children ranging in age from 4 to 9 years 
completed 3 reaction time (RT) tasks (spatial, verbal and selective attention).  
Children were grouped first by chronological age then by fluid IQ, and Brinley plots 
of RT and RT difference scores (argued to give a purer measure of cognitive speed) 
were produced for each grouping.  Two Brinley methods were compared:  fixing the 
intercept of the line of best fit at the origin (following Kail’s, 1991 method), and 
allowing it to vary.  These produced quite different functions with correspondingly 
different implications for the speed theory.  It is argued that previous findings of 
developmental speed increases (as measured by Brinley slope) may be an artifact of 
the fixed-intercept method.  When intercept was allowed to vary, findings indicated 
that speed did not change developmentally.  Furthermore, when absolute RT and RT 
difference score findings were compared, partial correlations indicated that RT was 
related primarily to age rather than MA or IQ, whereas RT difference scores were 
related directly to IQ, but not to age or MA.  We argue that the results are best 
accommodated by the theory that speed underlies stable IQ differences but not 
increases in MA.  Instead, we argue that MA change may be better accounted for by 
children’s increasing attentional ability. 
  
Footnotes 
1 Because Z scores estimated from small samples may be quite unstable and 
because of the lack of published norms for SPM performance of Australian children at 
the lower end of this age range, Z scores were also calculated relative to norms from a 
large sample of children (n = 458) from studies undertaken in the authors’ laboratory, 
with a minimum of 40 children in each age group.  The major findings using these Z 
scores do not differ from those reported here. 
 
2 Children were also grouped by MA defined by raw score on the SPM, but 
since the results from MA groups were highly similar to those from chronological age 
groupings, they are not reported here. 
 
3 These analyses were also conducted for each task separately and the pattern of 
correlations was found to be similar with two exceptions:  CPT from the attention and 
spatial tasks increased its correlation with SPM when age was partialled out 
(indicating that age acted as a suppressor variable) but the verbal task CPT showed a 
similar pattern to RT (but weaker).  
 
4 In a similar vein, differences may not have been found between age groups 
because the numbers of children in each age group was smaller than in each Z group, 
making performance measures less stable.  However, when we reanalysed our data 
using three broader age groups, we found precisely the same pattern as we have 
presented for the six age groups. 
 
 

